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This paper shows conditions under which a marginally progressive income tax emerges as 
the outcome of political competition between two parties, when labor is elastically supplied 
and candidates are uncertain about voters' choice at election day. Assuming the elasticity of 
labor is decreasing on marginal wage; following Coughlin and Nitzan (1981) only marginal 
progressive taxes are played by both candidates in equilibrium. If; instead, we adopt 
Lindbeck and Weibull (1989) probabilistic voting model, the equilibrium tax schedule will 
be progressive as long as the political power of the rich voter is sufficiently small. The 
degree of progressivity decreases with population polarization. 
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  11 Introduction 
The question, "Why do progressive taxes emerge in industrialized countries?", dates from 
Mirrlees seminal paper (1971). He showed that marginal progressive tax schedules, as we 
have in industrialized societies, were hardly optimal, unless we had a small elasticity of 
labor supply. A growing literature on political economy of taxation inspired by Roberts 
(1977), Romer (1975) and Meltzer and Richard (1981), questioned whether high marginal 
taxes could be part of a political equilibrium. Though, disincentives effects from taxation 
were taken into account, restrictions on the tax schedule were imposed making difficult to 
study tax progressivity. Among those that study tax progressivity, few of them considered 
disincentive effects from taxation (De Donder and Hindriks, 2003) the main literature built 
under the exogenous income hypothesis, see for example Marhuenda and Ortuño-Ortín 
(1995), Roemer (1999), Carbonell and Klor (2003) and Carbonell and Ok (2007). 
The starting literature on the political economy of taxation assumed a proportional income 
tax. Under some conditions on preferences such as single-crossing a Condorcet winner 
(CW) exists and both Downsian candidates play the CW tax rate in equilibrium. In the 
absence of labor disincentives (inelastic labor supply) if the median income is below the 
mean, then, the equilibrium marginal tax rate equals 100%. Even if endogenous labor 
supply is assumed taxes are still strictly positive and increasing with inequality, defined as 
the ratio of average income to median income. 
Nevertheless, assuming a linear income tax schedule could not help us to understand the 
fact that most industrial economies marginal tax rates are increasing with income. The aim 
of this paper is to understand why there is a democratic demand for income tax 
progressivity. In order to have a tax schedule that allows for (marginal) progressivity we 
  2need at least three parameters to vote for.
a One parameter specifies the lump-sum transfer 
(or level of public good), other, the linear tax rate, and the last capturing the concavity 
(regressivity) or convexity (progressivity) of the tax schedule. Thus, we are facing a 
multidimensional voting model. Conditions to have a CW in models with a 
multidimensional policy space are known to be very restrictive. For the quadratic tax 
function De Donder and Hindriks (2003) and Hindriks (2001) show that it is hard to avoid 
voting cycles. Other approaches than the direct democracy approach should be considered. 
Carbonell and Klor (2003) in a citizen candidate model found that, under some conditions, 
only marginal increasing tax rates are implemented in equilibrium. Roemer (1999) 
developed the PUNE concept (Party Unanimity Nash Equilibrium). The platform chosen by 
the party is the outcome of intraparty negotiation among party members. In equilibrium 
both parties announce marginal progressive taxes. In this paper we adopt the probabilistic 
voting model introduced by Coughlin and Nitzan (1981) and Coughlin (1992), and 
microfunded afterwards by Lindbeck and Weibull (1987). When voters cast their ballots in 
favor of one or another candidate they consider issues other than the economic issue, for 
instance ideology. Still, the higher the difference in economic utility, the higher will be the 
probability that a given voter favors the candidate that brings him the highest (economic) 
utility. Conditions for existence of equilibrium are less restrictive in the Coughlin model. A 
CW needs not to exist and, when it does exist, the equilibrium tax schedule does not need 
to coincide with the CW tax schedule. 
                                                 
a Note that if we restrict the policy space to tax functions ordered by Lorenz dominance, 
that is the case is after-tax income can be represented as xi = (yi)
1-τ (y)
τ, where y is common 
to all agents (it is determined so that average post-tax income equals per-capita income), yi 
is pre-tax income and τ is the tax parameter. A single parameter is enough to describe 
whether the tax schedule is marginal-rate progressive (0≤ τ ≥1), or regressive τ ≤ 0. See for 
instance Bénabou (2000). 
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voters choose probabilistically between candidates, with the probability to vote for one 
candidate increasing in the utility difference. The outcome of such a political process, as 
stressed by Coughlin and Nitzan (1981) in their Theorem 1, involves the maximization of a 
Nash welfare function. Indeed, in both models, Coughlin (CN) and Lindbeck and Weibull 
(LW), the equilibrium income tax maximizes some welfare function. In this sense the 
equilibrium income tax is efficient; it is on the economy’s Utility frontier. We show which 
conditions on the welfare function and the labor supply need to be satisfied for a marginal 
progressive tax to emerge in equilibrium. Moreover, if those conditions are met, then, the 
progressivity degree will decrease with population polarization. 
For simplicity, we assume quasi-linear preferences, for which income effects are zero. 
Therefore, when the tax rate paid by a given group increases, labor supply unambiguously 
decreases. Labor supply responses will add another mechanism for which a given vote is 
easier to catch. If the elasticity of labor is decreasing in marginal wage, as assumed, then, 
we could tax heavily the rich relative to the poor since the former decreases less his labor 
supply in response of an increase in the tax. In this sense there is more scope for tax 
progressivity than in the fixed (exogenous) income model. It is worth noting that there are 
little estimates on the elasticity of labor supply by income groups. Saez (2004) finds that 
upper middle income families and individuals do not appear to be sensitive to taxation, 
which supports our assumption of lower elasticity for the middle and high income groups. 
Nevertheless, significant elasticities are found at the very top of the income distribution. 
Whether those externalities could be explained solely by the evolution of marginal tax rates 
is not clear, given the heterogeneity in size of responses overtime.  
The probabilistic voting model would bring credible predictions in any of these three 
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we have interest groups representing voters that compete for influence. 
The rest of the paper goes as follows: Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 describes the 
labor supply decision of voters given the implemented tax schedule. In section 4 we 
describe the preferences of the different income groups over tax schedules. In section 5 we 
describe the political competition stage and the main results of the paper. Section 6 
concludes. 
2 The Model 
We develop a static model of political competition between two Downsian parties, A and B. 
Candidates or parties are uncertain about how the economic preferences of voters translate 
into party preferences. Parties announce simultaneously a policy platform t
C, C =A, B, a 
vector of marginal income tax rates, that maximizes their probability of winning. They 
commit to the platform announced. The party holding the majority of votes wins the 
election. Once the equilibrium platform is implemented voters make labor decisions. We 
solve the model backwards. 
2.1 The Probabilistic Voting Model 
The probabilistic voting model developed by Coughlin relaxes one of the assumptions of 
the traditional Downsian model: Candidates are certain about what voters choices will be in 
response of their announced platforms. 
In Coughlin and Nitzan (1981) and Coughlin (1992) even after voters have learned the 
decisions of both of the candidates in the race, candidates are uncertain about voters’ 
actions at the election day. This would also be the case if voters’ choices were stochastic in 
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Two possible interpretations of the Coughlin model are that voters do not vote 
deterministically but they are still rational: they vote with higher probability for the 
candidate whose policy platform brings them the highest utility. 
This raises the question of why voters do not vote according to their economic preferences. 
This leads to the second interpretation of the Coughlin model, where voters vote indeed 
deterministically but there are other issues apart from the economic issue, then, they may 
not vote for the party that promises them the best economic platform. Here voters are 
ideological.
Candidates use a logit model to infer voters' selection probabilities. In an economy with J  
voters the probability that a voter of group j votes for candidate A equals the relative utility 












B) = 1.  
The higher the economic utility from platform A the higher will be the probability that 
group j (or a representative voter in group j ) will vote for A. Parties are office-motivated. 
They choose simultaneously the policy platform that maximizes π
C(t
A, t




with  C=A, B. Among the main findings of the probabilistic voting model we cite the 
following: 




B) ) as long as Uj(t
C) is quasiconcave on t
C. Note this is a multidimensional problem and a 
CW may not exist. 
  62.- Policy convergence. Both candidates face a similar problem π
A(t
A, t




for B. This implies that they both choose the same policy platform and the probability of 
winning equals ½. 
3.- The outcome of the political competition game is the social alternative that maximizes a 
Nash social welfare function (Theorem 1 of Coughlin and Nitzan, 1981). 
Lindbeck and Weibull give a microfundation to (generalize) Coughlin’s model. They 
introduced ideology. A voter may cast their ballot in favor of a candidate that gives him 
lower economic utility if the utility from the non-economic issue overweights the economic 
loss. Although voters may indeed vote deterministically the Lindbeck and Weibull model is 
called a probabilistic voting model because of the close link it has with Coughlin’s model. 
We take the Lindbeck and Weibull approach here (section 6 explains the model in more 
detail) and discuss how our predictions change if we follow Coughlin. 
2.2 Preferences 
Voters are divided in 3 groups: poor (P), middle class (M) and rich (R). Population size is 
normalized to one. We assume the proportion of voters in group P equals the proportion of 
voters in group R which is α, proportion of M voters is then, 1-2α. Groups are differentiated 
by their marginal wage (ability) wj, with j=P,M,R, such that  0= wP < wM < wR.  
Total income of an individual in group j is yj = wjlj, where lj is labor effort chosen by voter 
j. Consumption equals after-tax income, cj = yj – T(yj), with T(yj) being total tax payment 
by the j-voter. 
We denote by Uj (cj, lj) the utility of a member of group j with consumption cj, and labor 
supply lj∈[0,L], and assume that Uj is increasing in consumption (cj) and decreasing in 
labor (cj) which can be seen as labor effort or hours worked per week, the last being an 
  7imperfect measure of labor effort. For simplicity we assume the utility function is 
quasilinear in consumption, Uj = u(cj + v(L - lj)), Uj is well behaved: u’ >0, u’’ <0, v’ >0, 
and v’’ <0. This utility specification will allow us to make straightforward comparisons 
between the outcomes of the two probabilistic voting models. We assume that the elasticity 
of labor defined as:                    is decreasing in marginal wage.   
2.3 The Tax Schedule 
Each group j pays a marginal tax rate of tj on income and receives a Lump-sum transfer Gj. 
All income tax collected finances a public good level, G and lump-sum transfers GM and 
GR, that favor group M and R, respectively. The government budget condition is: 
() R M M M j j j
R P j
G G y t y t G α α α α − − − − + = ∑
=
) 2 1 ( ) 2 1 (
,
G t,  
Provided our normalization of wages, where wP =0, the tax rate paid by group P is tP =0. 
Assume 0≤ tM , tR ≤1. This reduces the dimensionality of the economic platform to t =(tM , 
tR)∈T, where  ] 1 , 0 [ ] 1 , 0 [ : × T  is the set of possible income tax rates and G= GM, GR ≥ 0. 
The tax schedule will be marginal rate progressive whenever income tax rate increase with 
income. This means, for our particular case, that tR - tM >0. Further conditions should be 
given to guarantee that indeed yP ≤ yM ≤ yR. Given the disincentive effects from taxation we 
do not expect tM or tR to be larger than the income tax rates that maximize G. 
Given our tax schedule, from the government budget constraint balance condition, the 
political struggle takes place between two tax parameters: (tM, t R), and the lump-sum 
transfers (GM, GR), we can express the level of public good as: 
G(t,G) = (1 - 2α) tM yM + αtR yR  - (1-2 α)GM - (α)GR            (1) 






l  l 
w  l ∂ 
ε  = 
w ∂ 
  8conditions:  conditions: 
yR(t) ≥  yM(t) ≥  yP(t)                                              (2) yR(t) ≥  yM(t) ≥  yP(t)                                              (2)
In general, this condition is easier to satisfy the higher is the wage differential between 
groups R, M and M, P. Note that from preferences’ quasi-linear specification, labor supply 
does not depend on G. Once the winning platform is in place, voters choose their before tax 
income given the parameters of the tax function (t, G), this is equivalent to choose their 
labor supply. 
In general, this condition is easier to satisfy the higher is the wage differential between 
groups R, M and M, P. Note that from preferences’ quasi-linear specification, labor supply 
does not depend on G. Once the winning platform is in place, voters choose their before tax 
income given the parameters of the tax function (t, G), this is equivalent to choose their 
labor supply. 
   
3 Optimal labor supply  3 Optimal labor supply 
For the income tax schedule (tj, tR, G, GM, G R), the after-tax income is wPlP + G, (1 - 
tM)wMlM + G + GM,  (1 – tR)wRlR + G + GR, for the poor, middle class and rich voter, 
respectively. Given the tax parameters, voter-j decides over consumption and labor supply: 
For the income tax schedule (tj, tR, G, GM, G R), the after-tax income is wPlP + G, (1 - 
tM)wMlM + G + GM,  (1 – tR)wRlR + G + GR, for the poor, middle class and rich voter, 
respectively. Given the tax parameters, voter-j decides over consumption and labor supply: 
( )
j j j j j
j j l c
G G l w t c
t s
l L v c U
j j




) (   max
,
 
The optimal labor supply: 
( ) ( ) ( )
() () j j j
j j j j
w t h L l
x u l L v w t
− − = ⇔
= ′ − ′ − −
1
0 ) 1 (
 
   ∂  l  j 
∂  G   0  .  . 
Where xj = cj + v(L - lj) is consumption plus utility from leisure, and h = v’
-1 , with u’(xj) > 
0; from the concavity of v we know h(.) is decreasing in its argument. From the quasi-linear 
specification of xj there are no income effects, which implies that        an   ,  d   and 
Assume all voters supply strictly positive units of labor, that is (1 – tj)wj – v’(L) 
   ∂l ∂lj
∂wj  0
j 0   ∂tj
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Given this optimal labor supply the tax schedule feasibility constraints in (2) can be 
rewritten as, L 
() ( ) () ( ) ()
() ( ) () ( ) P P M M M P M
M M M R R R M R
w h w w t h w w w L
w t h w w t h w w w L
− − ≥ −
− − − ≥ −
1
1 1  
The above feasibility conditions give an upper bound to tM and tR; which are increasing in 
(wR  - wM) and (wM  - wP), respectively. 
 
4 Preferences over tax schedules 
Next we derive the group specific preferences over (t, G), given G(t, G) specified in (1) and 
pre-tax incomes yM = wM(L – h(1 - tM)wM) and yR = wR(L – h(1 – tR)wR).  
The indirect utility of voter P, 




Group P objective is to set (tM, tR) that maximize the public good level G, remember P does 
not pay income taxes. Assume  for j=M,R.
b It is easy to show that G(t, G) 
will be concave in (tM, tR) since                 ,                                                       ,               and 
                                                    . Naturally P will choose GM = GR = 0. The f.o.c. for a 
maximum,              
                          (3) 
                   
                                                                                      (4) 
                                                 
b Utility functions satisfying this assumption and the assumption on the elasticity of labor 
supply: v(lj) = - ½ (lj)
2, v(L- lj) = √(L- lj). 
   0
 ∂2G
∂tM
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The preferred tax schedule of voter P is the peak of the Laffer curve. 
Rearranging terms in (3) and (4), the tax schedule maximizing G satisfies, 
                                           (5)  1 = = R M ε ε











= ε . 
Whether the P-voter preferred tax schedule would be proportional, marginal rate 
progressive or regressive depends upon the specific utility function. For               εj will be 
decreasing in tj.
c After some computations    By assumption εl is decreasing 
(specifically non increasing) in wj which implies that εj will be increasing in wj. 









. 1 l t
t
j j
j ε ε − − =
These properties altogether ensures that the tax schedule maximizing the level of public 
good, determined by (5), can not be marginal-rate regressive. To show this, consider εj at 
the proportional tax rate tM = tR = t, since εj is increasing in wj, then εM(t) ≤ εR(t). If we 
increase tM such that tM > tR = t, being εj decreasing in tj then, necessarily εM(tM) < εM(t) ≤ 
εR(t). This proves that, under our assumptions on preferences, the preferred tax schedule of 
voter P is either proportional (tM = tR) or progressive (tM < tR).  
Group M pays income taxes at rate tM and receives the lump-sum transfer GM + G. Thus, 
group M preferred income tax minimizes his tax burden. The indirect utility of a voter M, 
                                                 
c Given that there are only substitution effects from taxation and by assumption the 
derivative of lj with respect to tj is decreasing in tj, εj will be decreasing in tj: 
()




















































   
 
 
  11() ( ) ( ) ) , , , 1 ( , , , M R M R M M M M R M R M M G G G t t G l w t u G G t t V + + − =  
The indirect utility VM(t,G) reaches a (global) maximum at   and  ) ˆ , 0 ( ) , ( R R M t t t =
() . ˆ ˆ
2 1





For all tM, tR belonging to T. Remember that 

t R  maximizes G(t,G) for a given tM.  
Note that such tax schedule is marginal rate progressive since tR − tM 

t R  0. 
Group R pays income taxes at rate tR and receives the lump-sum transfer G+GR. Thus group 
R preferred income tax minimizes his tax burden. The indirect utility of a voter R, 
  () ( ) ( ) ) , , , 1 ( , , , R R M R M R R R R M R M R G G G t t G l w t u G G t t V + + − =
Her utility is maximized under a regressive tax schedule: tM 

t M and  tR  0.  
Remember that  

t M  maximizes G(t,G) for a given tR.  
The following picture shows the different voters’ bliss-points.
d
[Figure 1 here] 
It should be noted that no CW winner exists in our voting game, as we can see in figure 
one. Any point in rectangle 0RPM can be defeated by a coalition of two groups. The shaded 
areas in Figure 1 represent the alternatives that can defeat alternative "o", which can be 
defeated by other alternatives generating a cycle (the voting paradox). 
Next section studies conditions under which only progressive taxes emerges in equilibrium 
in the probabilistic voting model.  
 
                                                 









t R  1
2 .   
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5 Political Competition 
We consider electoral competition between two office-motivated parties, A and B. They 
differ in their fixed ideology  position and may differ in the income tax schedule they 
announce. Parties commit themselves to the platform announced. 
We have a continuum of voters in each group differing in their ideological position, 
measured as their relative preference from one party over the other. In order to combine the 
economic and ideological side of voters' utility we assume that a voter i in group j will vote 
for party A if the extra "economic" utility he gets from the A’s platform exceeds his 
ideological preference for B relative to A. We may capture preferences over parties trough 
parameter σij, which is the location of voter i in group j along the real line. A positive 
(negative)  σij means that i in group j prefers B to A ( A to B) for the same platform 
announced. Voters with σij around zero are ideological neutral; they mainly evaluate the 
economic benefit they receive from the different platforms proposed by parties.  
The utility of a ij-voter is simply Vj(t
A  ,G
A) if party A wins and it is Vj(t
B,G
B) + σij 
otherwise. 
A voter i in group j will vote for A if: 





j V V σ + > ) , ( ) , ( G t G t
We assume that σij has group-specific cumulative distribution function Fj with density fj 
with support on the real line. The density function around zero gives us the proportion of 
ideologically neutral voters within each group. We next introduce conditions that guarantee 
existence of a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the electoral game. Such 
  13conditions, from Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), Enelow and Hinich (1989) and Couglhin 
(1992), were unified by Banks and Duggan (2004). Apart from those conditions, we need to 
add an additional one since in our model Fj is not independent of j. 
 Conditions On Fj and aggregate Vj : 
1)  C1. Fj is continuous and strictly increasing. 




B) is strictly concave on t
C, C = A, B: 
() ( ) ( ) ( )





R M P j





R M P j
B B A A A
V V F n
V V F n
G t G t G t G t
G t G t G t G t
, , 1 , ; ,
, , , ; ,
, ,
, ,









Where  nj is the proportion of voters in group j.  
3)  C3. Laussel and Le Breton (2002). This condition guarantees that at the political 
equilibrium of this game there is no profitable deviation.  
∀jf j is symmetric around zero and fj0  0.
 
We define the swing voter in group j as the voter that is indifferent between party A and 





Voters in group j with an ideological parameter, σij, smaller (or higher) than σj will vote for 
party A (respectively B). We assume there is no abstention. 






() ). ( ) ( Pr , ; , j j j j ij j
B B A A A
j F n n σ σ σ π = < = G t G t  
Total voting share of party A is: 
()() ( ) ) ( 2 1 ) ( , ; , R R M M P P
B B A A A F F F σ α σ α σ α π + − + = G t G t  
The probability of winning is an increasing function of the voting share. For simplicity, we 
  14assume the probability of winning equals aggregate voting share. The main raison why we 
make such assumption is that it allows us to compare the outcome of the Coughlin game 
(where parties maximize the probability of winning) with the outcome of the Lindbeck and 
Weibull game (where parties maximizes their expected voting share). 
The game presented above will be called LW from Lindbeck and Weibull. We assume for 
such a game that u(xj) is logarithmic with xj = cj + v(L-lj).  
Without loss of generality we write the probability of winning of party  A simply as 
(
B B G t G t , ; , ) π , where (t, G) is the platform chosen by party A, and  (t
B, G
B) the platform 
chosen by B. 
 Lemma 1 Assume conditions C1, C2 and C3 are satisfied. The bliss points of group P, M 
and R are never part of a political equilibrium. 
 Proof a) The bliss point of P is not an equilibrium. If it was an equilibrium then for a 
given  () ,   














B) actually increases as we move from  to lower tax 
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This proves that the preferred income tax of the P group can not be part of an equilibrium. 
b) The bliss point of M  is not an equilibrium.   
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This proves that an increase in tM and a decrease in tR, from the preferred platform of voter 
M, improves party A chances of winning. Then, the preferred income tax of the M group 
can not be part of equilibrium. 
c) The bliss-point of R is not an equilibrium. 
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This proves that the preferred income tax of the R group can not be part of the equilibrium. 
Moreover for fR sufficiently small GR=0 in equilibrium. 
The above proposition proves that under this political process the outcome will never 
correspond with the ideal income tax schedule of some group, because the probabilistic 
model implies some compromise between the voters. The fact that the probabilistic model 
in a multidimensional space picks a policy that is different from the ideal of some voter was 
already stressed in Casamatta, Cremer and Pestieau (2006). Indeed the equilibrium outcome 
in our setting is the outcome of a Nash bargaining between groups of voters for a linear 
utility, u(x) = x, with the political (bargaining) power of group P, M, and R given by α fP(0), 
(1-2α) fM(0) and α fR(0), respectively, with the disagreement utility set at zero for every 
group. 
  16 Proposition 1 Assume C1, C2 and C3 are satisfied. Assume that for all  tR ≤

t R   and  
tM ≤

t M  the feasibility constraints in (2) are satisfied. There exists a unique interior 
equilibrium. By symmetry of the game, at this equilibrium we have policy coincidence,  
tA  tB  t  with  tM 

t M  and  tR 

t R.   
 Proof Uniqueness comes from the fact that we maximize a strictly concave function (C2) 
under a convex set T. By symmetry of the model if (t
A, t
B) is an equilibrium so it is (t
B, t
A)   
from uniqueness necessarily tA  tB  t. If (2) is not binding, parties choose t
C  that 
maximizes a weighted sum of voters utilities (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987). Then, any tax  
tj 

t j with j=M, R; will not be played in equilibrium since it is Pareto dominated. From 




t R ,   the 
bliss-point of group P. Note that feasibility constraints in (2) can be omitted (will not be 








t M, where  R t ~  is the lowest possible tR satisfying 
(2) (remember that yj is decreasing in tj):  yR

t R − yM0  0.  Similarly for tM, 

t M :   
yM





t M  are higher the higher is wR and the lower is wP.  
The outcome of the LW game maximizes the following social welfare function: 
() ( )( ) ( ) ( ) G t G t G t G t , , 2 1 , , R R M M P P
LW V f V f V f S α α α + − + =  
where fj = fj (0), j = P, M, R. 
Since we are interested in tax progressivity next we develop conditions under which a 
progressive income tax emerges as the outcome of the LW game. Note that our assumption 
on the elasticity of labor supply (we assume that εl is decreasing in w) facilitates the 
implementation of a progressive income tax since the labor response of the R-group to 
changes on the marginal tax rate they pay is lower than that of the M group. Moreover the 
  17decreasing marginal utility of consumption (net of labor disincentives) facilitates the 
emergence of a progressive income tax schedule by increasing the political power of groups 
P and M compared to that of group R. In other words, the marginal utility loss from an 
increase in the tax rate tR is lower for group R than it would be a proportional increase in tM 
for M’s utility, which makes group M more sensitive to changes on tM. Despite all this a 
proportional or even marginal regressive income tax may arise in equilibrium if the 
proportion of ideologically neutral voters fR is sufficiently large. 
The equilibrium income tax satisfies the following first order conditions, 
tM,tR1 − |MtM|xMtM,tR − fM  0
tM,tR1 − |RtR|xRtM,tR − fR  0
 
where   () ()
()
() () . , , ,
2 1












R M t t
α α α Φ + + =
−   
The tax schedule will be marginal rate progressive if at the proportional tax schedule there 
is a profitable deviation to a more progressive schedule (higher tR or/and lower tM). From 
uniqueness this would imply that the equilibrium income tax schedule is not proportional, 
nor regressive since there would not be a profitable deviation from moving toward a 








Since εj is increasing in wj the expression 
( )








ε  Given that, xj is increasing in wj  





j  which implies that 
( )
() . 1 ,
, < t t x
t t x
R
M   If fM ≥ fR, only marginal progressive 
taxes emerge in equilibrium (note that this is stronger than needed). 
 Proposition  2  The equilibrium income tax is marginal progressive as long as the 
  18inequality below holds,  
() () ()






t t x t







ε                                                                                                 (7)     
 
 Proof From the proportional tax a progressive tax is a profitable deviation for Party A if,  
t,t1 − |Mt|xMt,t − fMdtM  t,t1 − |Rt|xRt,t − fRdtR  0 for 
dtM<0 and dtR  >0. Dividing both sides by the RHS of the expression in brackets and 
rearranging terms we find condition (7) for progressivity in the LW game. 
We now follow the approach of Coughlin (1992). From Coughlin and Nitzan (1981) we 
know that the outcome of the electoral competition game is the social alternative that 
maximizes a Nash social welfare function. For simplicity we assume that   
VjtM,tR  xjtM,tR.   
The party's objective function is then, 
() () ( ) ( ) ( ) G t G t G t G t , ln , ln 2 1 , ln , R M P
CN x x x S α α α + − + =  
Note that the equilibrium outcome of this game is the result of a Nash bargaining between 
the three groups of voters with the political (bargaining) power of group P, M and R given 
by α, (1 – α) and α, respectively, and the disagreement utility set at zero for every group. In 
this game the political power of the poor and the rich are the same the first prefers a 
progressive (or proportional) income tax and the last a regressive tax, while voter M 
unambiguously prefers a progressive income tax, hence only marginally-rate progressive 
taxes emerge in equilibrium. 
 Proposition 3 If the elasticity of labor supply decreases with wage, only marginal rate 
progressive taxes emerge in equilibrium. 
 Proof Note that the CN game is equivalent to the LW game for Fj independent of j (this 
  19was previously stressed by Banks et al., 2004). In such a case fj = f, i.e. fM = fR . As proved 
in Proposition 2, this is a sufficient condition for marginal progressive taxes. 
When voters choose a candidate (party) probabilistically the best response for both 
candidates is to announce a marginal rate progressive tax schedule. Because, when 
competing for elections, parties try to attract swing voters, whose probability to vote for the 
party increases a lot in response to a marginal increase in their consumption. The 
probability that a group vote for a given party, say A, is concave in their consumption 
(being lnVj a proxy for the probability of voting for the party). Then, voters in group P and 
M are more attractive than voters in group R, since they increase faster the probability to 
vote for the party that benefits them. Under our assumption of decreasing elasticity of labor 
on wages, the preferred tax schedule of P is either proportional or progressive. This 
guarantees that a move from (proportionality) regressivity toward progressivity is 
profitable. It captures more swing voters, since the marginal gain in increasing consumption 
for group M is higher than the marginal loss caused to group R.  
 
5.1 Comparative Statics 
We wonder at this point how the degree of progressivity changes as a result of a change in 
the parameters of the model. Assume (2) is satisfied at the solution of S
CN: () . 
* *,G t
 Proposition 4 1. In the CN game an increase in population polarization, measured by α, 
decreases the progressivity degree. 
2. An increase in fM (fR) decreases the equilibrium tax rate tM (tR). Public good level is 
increasing in fP for the LW game. 
  20 Proof At the equilibrium tax schedule ( )
∗ ∗
R M t t , , 
                 (8) 
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x   Then, necessarily( ) 0





















x   Then, necessarily( ) 0












x . Consider now a different 
economy with α’ > α. At (  it can be easily showed that a higher α gives a higher 
weight to the negative part of the f.o.c. in (9) and a lower weight to the positive part  
)
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From concavity of  .,   this implies that the equilibrium tax rate tR at the economy α’ is 
lower than   () , α
∗
R t   i.e.   () ( ). α α
∗ ∗ < ′
R R t t  Likewise, at  ( )
∗ ∗
R M t t ,     0 > ∂
∂
M t

















From concavity of  .,   this implies that the equilibrium tax rate tM at the economy α’ is 
higher than   () , α
∗
M t   i.e.   () ( ). α α
∗ ∗ > ′












  21The progressivity degree is lower the higher is population polarization. 
2. In the LW model applying the implicit function theorem to the first order conditions we 
study how tM changes in response to a change in fM, 
 
 































M M M t M M M t t x x t where      ε Φ Φ ε
ε Φ G t G t D
by concavity of π(t,G) on T. Substituting     in the above equation: 





M ε α   Similarly for  tR,   
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ε α Then,  
The degree of progressivity decreases with fR, since   ()0 , > = ∂
∂
R M R R t t x f
α Φ   and more generally  







t Φ  j=P,R. Finally the lump-sum transfer level   is 
increasing in f
( R M t t G , )
P, the political power of the group whose preferred tax schedule maximizes 


















































If we think of  (   as the solution to a bargaining among groups P, M and R with the 
disagreement option settled at zero utility, and αf
)
∗ ∗
R M t t ,
P, (1- 2α) f M and αfR as the bargaining 
(political) power of P, M and R, respectively. The previous result states that the degree of 
progressivity decreases with the political power of group M, the group whose preferred tax 
is maximal progressivity. In CN the size of a group measures his political power, thus 
  22regardless of how population is distributed among groups, tax progressivity increases as the 
size of group M increases (or population polarization decreases).  This is the case in both 
models. Finally in LW the lump-sum transfer or public good level, G, is unambiguously 
increasing in the political power of group P. 
 
6 Conclusions 
We wanted to show that despite there is only substitution effects from taxation, only 
marginal rate progressive taxes will emerge as the political equilibrium for the CN game. 
Our assumption on the elasticity of labor supply (that εl is decreasing in marginal wage) is 
crucial for our result. It facilitates the implementation of marginal progressive taxes in both 
models (CN and LW) with respect to the fixed or exogenous income case. Indeed the 









t t x < ,
,  (condition in 
Proposition 1 for progressivity at the fixed income case). In this context labor disincentives 
gives makes the richer group cheaper to tax than the middle class.  
Since the CN and the LW political equilibrium could be understood as the result of the 
bargaining among groups, tax progression is decreasing in population polarization in CN, 
which is equivalent to the size (bargaining power) of the P and R groups. For analogous 
reasons tax progression will be increasing in the political power of the middle class, (1-
2α)fM, for the LW game. A larger degree of marginal progressivity is expected in societies 
with a stronger middle class. 
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